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LOVE, FRIENDSHIP AND MORAL MOTIVATION 
Abstract 
The love that we feel for our friends plays an essential role in both our moral motivation to act 
towards them; and in our moral obligations towards them, that is, in our special duties. We 
articulate our proposal as a reply to Stephen Darwall’s second-person proposal, which we take 
to be a contemporary representative of the Kantian view. According to this view, love does not 
have a necessary role neither in moral motivation, nor in moral obligation; just a 
complementary one. Yet this proposal faces three difficulties: a psychological problem, a 
practical problem, and a theoretical problem. In contrast, we argue that both moral 
motivation, and moral obligations emerge from our interpersonal relations with particular 
others. We further argue that obligations in the context of friendship are moral because they 
come with a feeling of obligation and have been internalized. Thus, the three problems raised 
to the Kantian position are clarified, and the role of love is emphasized in both our moral 
motivation, and our moral obligations towards friends. 
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“It is the time you have wasted for your rose that 
makes your rose so important” 
(Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little Prince) 
 
Love, Friendship, and Moral Motivation 
In the middle of her morning news show, the journalist Robin stands up, picks up her stuff 
and hastily leaves. She has received a call telling her that her friend Ted just had a traffic 
accident and is at hospital by himself. Watching this scene from the sitcom ‘How I Met 
Your Mother’, we as the audience assent, consider that as a valid reason, and approve her 
action. She feels that she cannot but go; it is her friend, she ought to go. The fact that a 
person that she loves is in trouble moves her; and it also counts as a valid reason for her to 
abandon her work responsibilities. Furthermore, we would consider it morally 
reproachable if she decided to stay despite her friend’s need of help. This is indeed what 
happens with another character who decides to stay at his appointment meeting. Were 
Robin to act like this, her friends would feel resentment towards her, and she would 
probably feel remorse, and guilt.  
There are two aspects worth considering in cases like this one: a motivational, and a 
normative one. Regarding the motivational aspect, Robin leaves because she feels strongly 
motivated to help her friend Ted. We are not surprised by her reaction, because we can 
expect it given the situation, and the tight bond between them. Regarding the normative 
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aspect, the fact that Robin’s friend is in trouble counts for her as an overriding reason to 
evade her responsibility to host the news show. We also consider it a valid reason, one that 
justifies her behavior. The fact that her friend is in trouble both motivates and justifies 
Robin’s leaving the set. 
The question that arises from cases like this is: why does Robin have both a motivation 
and a justification to help her friend in need? The first reply that comes to mind is 
“because Robin loves her friend”, that is, both her moral motivation and her moral 
obligation have to do with the relationship between her and her friend. In these scenarios, 
by “love” we mean a minimal notion of interpersonal love, understood as an affective 
state directed at another person for the sake of being that person. In Greek terms, this kind 
of love is referred to as philia; which originally referred to the affectionate regard we have 
towards friends, family members, business partners, and even a country (Helm, 2013). 
This is the kind of love which is at stake in our relationships with our siblings, our family 
relatives and, importantly, our friends1.  
In this sense, love is constitutive of our interpersonal relationships with others, and it has 
both a motivational and a justificatory force. However, not everybody agrees on this 
interpretation about moral motivation, and moral obligation. For example, a distinguished 
view originating in Kant says that although Robin loves her friend, what should motivate 
her to act is her sense of duty, and not her love for Ted; and that what justifies her 
 
1 Notice that this notion of love is different from a kind of universal love to humankind, such as sympathy, 
compassion, or concern. Claims about the moral function of such a kind of love have already been made 
(Blum, 2010; Held, 2006; Nagel, 1970; Noddings, 2010; Slote, 1999), and the classical Greek term related to 
that would not be philia,  but agape.  
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behavior is that it derives from the moral law, not that she is acting out of love. Kantians 
especially insist on this separation between the domain of duty, and the domain of love.  
In this paper, we ask ourselves whether the love we feel for our friends2 plays any role in 
either our moral motivation to act towards them; or in our moral obligations towards 
them, that is, in our special duties3. Contrary to the Kantian approach, we argue that love 
plays an essential role in both. We articulate our proposal as a reply to Stephen Darwall’s 
second-person proposal, which we take to be a contemporary representative of the 
Kantian view. In section 2, we briefly consider Kant’s view to spell out its continuities and 
discontinuities with Darwall’s view. According to the Kantian view, love does not have a 
necessary role neither in moral motivation, nor in moral obligation; just a complementary 
one. In section 3, we raise three difficulties for this view: a psychological problem, a 
practical problem, and a theoretical problem. We develop each of these problems in 
sections 5, 6 and 7, respectively. In section 8, we defend that both moral motivation, and 
moral obligation emerge from our interpersonal relations with particular others. In section 
9, we further argue for our claim that obligations in the context of friendship are moral, as 
they come with a feeling of obligation, and have been internalized. Thus, the three 
problems raised to the Kantian position are clarified, and the role of love is emphasized in 
both our moral motivation, and our moral obligations towards friends.  
Moral Motivation, Moral Obligation, and Love in Kant’s Picture  
 
2For the ease of the discourse, we will only talk about friends. However, the same reasoning applies to 
siblings, partners, relatives and the like, as far as we love them as we love our closest friends. 
3In the literature, the duties or obligations that stem from a particular relationship have been called “special 
duties”, or “special obligations” (Jeske, 2014). We indistinctively use “special duties”, “special obligations” or 
even “moral obligations towards friends”.  
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In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), in Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and 
in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant does not envision another necessary source of 
proper moral motivation than the feeling of respect; neither does he envision another 
source of moral obligation than universalizability. According to Kant, we humans should 
feel motivated to act morally because of the feeling of respect (5:73, 75); and we are 
justified to do it, that is, we must do it, if and only if the maxim we are acting upon is 
universalizable (4:421). In other words, under the ideal of moral perfection, motivation is 
supposed to flow from justification of obligation. 
In more detail, in the Kantian framework, moral motivation should be the result of a 
twofold intellectual process: the awareness of the moral law; and the drive to act according 
to it. As for the awareness of the moral law, i.e., our moral duty, it should take place 
through the practical dimension of the pure reason; through what Kant calls “the fact of 
reason” (5:31). According to Kant, the mere recognition of the moral law should be 
sufficient to motivate the holy will to act morally (5:32). Yet even Kant was aware that in 
non-holy wills the awareness of the moral law might not be enough. As pathologically 
affected wills, we humans are moved by our subjective desires (4:454). Our natural 
inclinations do not always follow the verdicts of reason; therefore, we need a drive that 
motivates us to act according to those verdicts. We find this second aspect of moral 
motivation in the feeling of respect. Due to the moral feeling of respect for the moral law 
(5:75), we are aware of the greater value of the moral law, in comparison to our happiness, 
and feel motivated to act accordingly. Thus, both the awareness of the moral law, and the 
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drive to act according to it through the feeling of respect motivate us to act morally, in 
Kant’s account.  
Despite his idealistic project, Kant acknowledged that humans might come short of the 
ideal of morality that he drew, and hence accepted that human morality might not be 
ideal. Kant understood that, in the case of humans, the awareness of the moral law and the 
feeling of respect might not be strong enough to make us humans act according to what 
we are justified to do. Because of the limits of humans’ moral capacity, he realized that 
sometimes we end up doing what is correct because of other motivations, or “moral 
endowments” (6:399), such as “moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and 
respect for oneself (self-esteem)” (6:399). One of those motivations is love or, as Kant called 
it, “mutual love” (6:449), “love of one’s neighbor” (6:399) or “benevolence” (5:82).  
According to Kant, love has an indirect or secondary role in moral motivation: it is part of 
those “subjective conditions in human nature that [...] help [people] in fulfilling the laws of 
a metaphysics of morals” (6:217). It is one of those “moral endowments” (6:399) which 
make us feel motivated to act morally. However, as love is capricious, changeable, 
transitory, and biased; it is unreliable as a moral motive (6:470). Therefore, according to 
Kant, love has a role in moral motivation, but it is just a compensatory one. It can make us 
do the right thing when the sense of duty, or the feeling of respect, fails to properly 
motivate us to act morally (shame on us); but it is neither sufficient, nor necessary for 
moral motivation.  
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Neither does love ground moral obligation; that I love somebody is not the kind of reason 
that can make helping her the right thing to do. When acting out of love, I am acting based 
on partiality, and self-interest; because “love is not anxious about any inner refusal of the 
will toward the law” (5:84). Consequently, according to Kant, Robin’s justification to help 
her friend is not that her friend is involved but rather that it is someone who needs her. 
The maxim of helping a person in need might be a universalizable one which derives from 
the moral law. Being aware of this justification should move her to help her friend. Only if 
this motivation fails, love can help so that the right thing is carried out after all.  
Moral Motivation, Moral Obligation and Love in Darwall’s picture 
Stephen Darwall’s proposal is particularly relevant in this discussion. He is a 
representative of a contemporary Kantian proposal (Darwall, 2009), and he focuses 
especially on relations, interactions and emotions (Darwall, 2013, 2016, 2017, 2019; Dill & 
Darwall, 2014). His proposal might be interpreted as an attempt to integrate the 
sentimentalist impartial spectator within the Kantian framework (Isern-Mas & Gomila, 
2020). Hence his relevance in the matter of morality, and friendship.  
In The Second Person Standpoint (2006), Stephen Darwall reinterprets the Kantian morality 
from the second-person standpoint. The second-person standpoint is “the perspective you 
and I take when we make and acknowledge claims on one another’s conduct and will” 
(Darwall, 2006, p.3). The paradigmatic example of such a perspective is the one where a 
person steps on someone’s foot. The person whose foot has been stepped on has a claim; 
they can hold the other accountable. The person who stepped on the others’ foot has the 
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responsibility to comply with the legitimate demand of the other. Both the right to 
demand, and the responsibility to comply come from the awareness that any member of 
the moral community would endorse such dynamics. According to Darwall, it is this 
perspective which is at the core of most of our moral notions, such as moral motivation or 
moral obligation. Consequently, Darwall grounds both moral motivation and moral 
obligation not in the individual awareness of the moral law, as usual in the Kantian 
position, but in the intersubjective dynamics of accountability. As we will see in this 
section, according to Darwall, we are both motivated and justified to act morally because 
we are aware of what others, and we ourselves, can hold us accountable for not doing. The 
role of love is not necessary in these dynamics, and therefore it is not necessary for moral 
motivation, neither for moral obligation.  
Darwall also follows Kant in his understanding of love as a kind of beneficence, yet he 
gives an interpretation of it based on the second-person standpoint. According to Darwall 
(2006), love is a second-personal phenomenon. It takes place in interpersonal relationships; 
it gives reasons to act; it is addressed to persons; it seeks reciprocity; it implies certain 
duties and expectations; and it presupposes a second-personal relationship between the 
interactive parties. Love, as an attitude of the heart, is part of “that aspect of the human 
psyche through which we are heartened or disheartened, inspired or deflated, encouraged 
or discouraged, filled with hope and joy or deflated with despair, emptiness, or sadness” 
(Darwall, 2017). It helps bonding and seeks reciprocity. Therefore, both Kant and Darwall 
see love as an affective attitude that can be directed at any person for the sake of being a 
person.  
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Love and Moral Motivation in Darwall’s picture 
Darwall takes the rational individual deliberation that Kant proposes and interprets it in 
terms of the second-person theory. In Kant’s account of the fact of reason, we come to 
recognize the moral law through moral deliberation and, consequently, we recognize our 
autonomy as lawgiving wills. However, according to Darwall (2009), this “deliberative 
standpoint alone” (p. 148) only gives us reasons to act according to the moral law, but it 
does not explain its motivational force: “the most that (first-personal) practical 
presupposition arguments can show is that a deliberating agent must treat the moral law 
(and the dignity of persons) as normative reasons for compliance” (p.142). According to 
Darwall, when these reasons are seen as intersubjective demands, they get an additional 
authority on us because we feel the responsibility they involve, i.e., we feel accountable or 
answerable for non-compliance. Hence Darwall’s project of the second-person standpoint.  
Indeed, moral motivation is defined as “an intrinsic desire to comply with moral demands 
to which one may be legitimately held accountable, or equivalently, to comply with one’s 
moral obligations” (Dill & Darwall, 2014, p.14). Consequently, he explains moral 
motivation as a consequence of an implicit understanding of the practice of holding others 
accountable. The moral subject feels the sense of duty, and it is motivated by it, because he 
is aware of the possibility of being held accountable, even by himself, if he fails to act 
morally without excuse (Darwall, 2006). This awareness needs not to be explicit, and it can 
be implicit in the subjects’ emotions, or “reactive attitudes” (Strawson, 1974), such as guilt, 
remorse or indignation.   
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Accordingly, what makes the difference for Robin between staying at the set and helping 
her friend Ted is that she acknowledges what we, and other members of the moral 
community including herself, would have the authority to demand that she so behave. If 
she stayed at the set, she would consider our indignation, and Ted’s resentment justified. 
According to Darwall, Robin’s moral motivation comes from her second-personal 
reasoning about what she could justifiably be held accountable for not doing. Hence, 
moral motivation emerges from accountability, but not from love.  
Darwall follows Kant in that love has a complementary role for moral motivation; and that 
love is neither sufficient nor necessary for moral motivation. Yet Darwall has a more 
detailed justification for that position based on the difference between respect, and love.  
According to Darwall (2016), the key difference between the feelings of love and respect is 
that they are differently related to accountability, and hence they have different roles in 
moral motivation. Respect is part of the realm of mutual accountability, whereas love is 
part of the realm of mutual openness. In Darwall’s view, love mediates forms of personal 
attachment and connection that are not essentially deontic; that is, it takes place in 
relationships where justification does not have an essential role.  
For instance, when I resent the person who is skipping in the line, I implicitly demand 
apologies from that person. By feeling resentment, I hold that person accountable, and ask 
from that person a recognition of my claim; and compliance with their duties towards me 
as a person. I expect from them to reciprocate the recognition I have shown them, and that 
they had violated by skipping in the line. This case is different from the case where I help a 
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friend. When I help a friend in trouble, I do not ask for any attitude in response. I expect 
that they will reciprocate, but I cannot demand it. As Darwall’s emphasizes, love is a freely 
given attitude, it cannot be claimed; therefore, in my helping them I am neither 
responding to a legitimate demand, nor demanding anything from them in return.  As we 
can see, both kinds of attitudes are similar because they both seek reciprocity. Yet this 
reciprocity is of a different kind, according to Darwall. In love we expect reciprocity in the 
good relationship, the attachment, and the mutual presence; in respect we expect 
reciprocity in the form of mutual respect, and in mutual accountability.  
Therefore, Darwall agrees with Kant that love cannot be neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient source of moral motivation because it is not related to accountability. It only has 
a complementary role, as Kant says, when the sense of duty comes short in motivating 
humans because of our imperfect moral psychology. Focusing on the case of our moral 
motivation towards friends, we might feel motivated to help them as persons qua persons, 
and hence out of a sense of duty; and also as friends, and hence out of love. Yet, according 
to Darwall, in both cases the feeling of respect is sufficient to motivate us to act according 
to our moral obligations; love only helps us to feel motivated when the feeling of duty is 
not enough, as a sort of deviant cause.   
Love and Moral Obligation in Darwall’s picture 
Darwall also denies the role of love in grounding our moral obligations. According to 
Darwall, a moral obligation is “what we are (morally) responsible for doing, what 
members of the moral community, including we ourselves, have the authority to demand 
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that we do, by holding us accountable second-personally” (Darwall, 2009, p.149). In other 
words, it is “what the moral community can demand (and what no one has the right not to 
do)” (Darwall, 2006, p.20). All the members of the moral community, for the sake of being 
members of the moral community, can hold another member accountable for 
incompliance without excuse. Consequently, my moral obligations are what any member 
of the moral community can hold me accountable for not doing, even if that person is not 
directly affected by my wrongdoing.  
One might say that Darwall’s account of moral obligation implies that both the victim and 
the witness of a moral transgression have the same right to hold the transgressor 
accountable (Wallace, 2007). Yet Darwall acknowledges that circumstances put people in 
different positions to claim, and hence under different obligations. If I am in a crowded 
meeting and I step on someone’s foot, this person has a distinctive second-personal 
authority to ask me to remove my foot, as a person whose foot I stepped onto. 
Consequently, I have a special obligation towards that person to compensate for the pain I 
might have caused them. They have an authority upon me which other members of the 
moral community lack.  
Although moral obligations are shaped by the circumstances, as described, Darwall 
contends that they are still impartial and universalizable. They are what any member of 
the moral community in that particular situation would have the right to demand; they 
could be endorsed from a “perspective that we can all share as free (second-personally 
competent) and rational” (Darwall, 2006, p.276). In the case where I step onto someone’s 
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foot, any person in the position of the person whose foot I stepped onto has the right to 
demand that I remove my foot. Any member of the moral community, including myself, 
would make that demand, and therefore my moral obligation to comply is universalizable, 
and impartial. Even more, in Darwall’s schema there is no need for anybody, not even me, 
to effectively address the demand for the obligation to exist. His project is analytical, not 
psychological.  
In Darwall’s picture, then, there is room for special duties, derived from the relationships 
particular agents get involved in. From this point of view, love might be relevant to our 
moral duties if it may give rise to special duties. Our love might change the circumstances 
of the people we love, and hence affect our moral obligations towards them. But Darwall 
does not view love as grounding any duties at all. If we have special obligations towards 
the people we love, it is not because of love itself; but because our loving them places them 
in a position which gives them special authority over us. Darwall calls these special 
obligations “obligations of loving relationship” (2016, p.172), or “duties of relationship” 
(2016, p.177). They are obligations which are shaped by the loving relationship between 
the people involved in the dynamics of making and acknowledging claims on one another; 
and they address the other as “a-person-who-happens-to-stand-in-that-specific-putatively-
normative-relation” (2006, p.270). 
These special obligations are not actually grounded in love; they are still grounded in 
accountability. For instance, the justification of Robin’s obligation to help Ted is not that 
she is obliged to help those she loves, but rather it is that any member of the moral 
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community, including herself, could justifiably hold her accountable if she failed to do it 
without excuse. Furthermore, despite being shaped by love, according to Darwall, these 
special duties are still universalizable and impartial. They are what any person in that 
relationship should do. Accordingly, the person or moral member of the moral community 
who occupies the position of being Robin’s friend has certain authority for the sake of that 
position which other members lack. Consequently, what explains Robin’s special 
obligation towards Ted is not love, but the existence of a historical relationship between 
Robin and him. In this relationship, love changes the moral obligations of both Robin and 
Ted, yet it does not justify them. Their justification is identical to any other duty. 
The Case of Barney 
As we have seen, the Kantian position contends that love only complements moral 
motivation, without being necessary; and that it only shapes moral obligations, without 
justifying them. Against this view, we present the case of Barney from the sitcom ‘How I 
Met Your Mother’ as a case study. We slightly change the plot for argumentative purposes 
so that it resonates with Lawrence Blum’s (1980) contraposition between Manny and Dave 
(p.146-8); and with Kant’s example of the man who helps others out of duty because he 
cannot sympathize with them (4:398). We use this case to raise three concerns to the 
Kantian view of moral motivation and moral obligation in the context of love and 
friendship: a psychological problem, because it is psychologically inaccurate; a practical 
problem, because it is undesirable in practice; and a theoretical problem, because it is 
implausible. 
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Imagine now that instead of calling Robin, Ted calls his friend Barney to ask for help. In 
the sitcom, Barney frequently treats his social interactions as a game, for which he has 
laws, rules, and theories. One of Barney’s theoretical inventions is what he calls “the Bro 
code”, a set of rules regulating how “bros”, good friends, ought to act to one another. And 
also imagine that, even though Barney loves Ted as much as Robin does, when he acts to 
help him, he does not do it out of love, but out of duty. He spends time with Ted, and he 
treats him with due care, as Robin does. Yet Barney does not do it “because it is Ted”, as 
Robin does, but “because that is what the Bro code prescribes”, or similarly “because that 
is what friends do”. This acknowledgement of what is the moral thing to do towards 
friends is what motivates Barney to act as a friend. Now, when Ted is in trouble, Barney 
knows what he is required to do; he recognizes his special obligation towards his friend as 
a friend and, from this recognition, he feels morally motivated to help Ted. He acts 
genuinely out of duty; he recognizes his moral obligation, and this motivates him to act.  
For the sake of the argument, we will assume that the difference between Barney and 
Robin is that Barney acts purely out of duty, whereas Robin seems to need the feeling of 
love to comply with what the moral law requires from her. Both Robin and Barney feel 
morally motivated to help Ted, and both recognize their moral obligation towards him. 
Yet Barney does not need love to be motivated, neither to recognize his moral obligations. 
Therefore, in agreement with the Kantian position, love would not be necessary to feel 
motivated to act morally towards friends, neither to recognize our special duties towards 
them. Furthermore, if the only reason and motivation that Robin had was love (as we 
assume), she would help Ted not because that is the right thing to do, as Barney does, but 
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because that is a good thing for her friend, independently of the value of that maxim as a 
moral law. As moral actions must be motivated and justified by moral considerations, 
Robin’s reason is hence a reason of the wrong kind to act morally.  
Specifically, it follows from Darwall’s view that Barney’s moral psychology is possible. 
Although Darwall does not give this example, he defends that love is not necessary to 
motivate us to help friends in trouble; and that love is not what justifies our moral 
obligation to do so. In both cases the sense of duty is sufficient. This is a consequence of 
the required “moral point of view” of the Kantian approach, which “involves abstracting 
from one’s own interests and one’s particular attachments to others” (Blum, 1980, p.2). 
Even if the aim of the Kantian approach is not to describe human relationships, but to 
assert how these should be; it needs at least to assume that rational and free agents, and a 
universal and impartial point of view are both possible. 
The Psychological Problem: Friendship implies Motivation to be Partial 
The characterization of Barney’s motivation to help his friend is not an accurate 
characterization of our moral psychology. Indeed, the Bro code is presented as a gag, but 
not as something possible in real life. Furthermore, even if it was possible, it would be 
rare. Our psychology is shaped in such a way that, in friendship, we feel motivated to act 
out of love, and not only out of duty (Scanlon, 2000). To put it in a clearer way, in 
situations involving a friend, we feel motivated to act because of the particular 
relationship we have to this other person, that is, out of what we will call a “motivation to 
be partial”; and not just for the norm itself, what we will call “motivation to be impartial”.  
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In this context, the pair motivation to be partial and motivation to be impartial resonates 
with the pair agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons (Nagel, 1986; Parfit, 1984). Agent-
neutral reasons are reasons for everyone, as they do not include any essential reference to 
the person who has them; agent-relative reasons might not be for everyone, as they 
include an essential reference to the person who has them. Whereas these reasons refer to 
the justification of an action, the distinction between motivation to be partial and to be 
impartial refers to what motivates it. As Stocker (1976) notices, some moral theories 
overlooked this distinction, by overlapping both justifications and motivations, and 
promoted a kind of “moral schizophrenia”. Motivation externalists, such as Railton (1984), 
are aware that what justifies an action might be different from what motivates it. Relying 
on this distinction, then, we distinguish justification and motivation, and contend that we 
might sometimes be motivated by the binding force of the norm; and sometimes out of 
concern for the person involved, whatever the justifying reason for the action might be.  
In the case of Ted’s friends, Robin is moved by the fact that the person needing help is Ted 
in particular; whereas Barney is moved by the implicit norm, explicit norm for him, that 
friends ought to help each other. Probably when Robin says that she must go “because my 
friend Ted just had a traffic accident, and he is at hospital by himself” the emphasis lies in 
“my friend Ted” rather than in “friend at hospital”. If that is the case, what moves Robin 
to act is that her friend Ted is involved, whatever the trouble might be. In fact, if someone 
asked her why she must leave, they would not be surprised by a reply along the lines of 
“because it is my friend Ted”. This reply is also available to Barney. Yet the difference 
between him and Robin is that the emphasis in this case lies in “friend at hospital” rather 
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than in “friend Ted”. Unlike Robin, what moves Barney to act is the acknowledgement of 
the norm of what we ought to do for our friends in trouble4.  
The Kantian position acknowledges that not everyone will act out of duty or, as we put it, 
out of motivation to be impartial. For instance, we might reject torture out of a motivation 
to be partial, because we are moved by the pain felt by someone being hurt; or we might 
reject it out of motivation to be impartial, because we consider it in tension with the moral 
law. Yet, according to the Kantian approach, even though someone might act motivated to 
be partial, everyone could, and should, act motivated to be impartial, even in the context 
of friendship.  
In real life this kind of motivation might be found in some institutionalized relationships 
such as politician-citizen, seller-customer, teacher-student, or doctor-patient. These 
relationships are based on respect; hence their actions are motivated by the sense of duty 
and justified by the principles and norms guiding those relations. Yet in our personal 
relations to others, as in friendship, we hardly establish the kind of rational, abstract 
relationship that Kant and Darwall consider. Hence, it is puzzling that in real friendship 
we might be motivated to act only out of sense of duty; neither that we would justify our 
action appealing to the moral law.  
The kind of relationship that binds friends to help each other is not an ideal one; but a 
particular, and affective one. Interpersonal relationships matter in morality: our moral 
 
4 Notice that the content of Barney’s norm might be partial, defending that we ought to treat friends 
differently. The point is rather that what motivates him is the norm itself, whatever its content might be, 
and whoever its target.    
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judgments change depending on our relationships with those involved in them (Bonnefon 
et al., 2016; Haidt & Baron, 1996; Lee & Holyoak, 2020), as change our moral obligations 
towards people depending on our relationships with them (Chalik & Dunham, 2020; Earp 
et al., 2020; McManus et al., 2020; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013). Furthermore, our moral 
tendencies evolutionarily come from relational dynamics: specific interactive practices, 
prospects to cooperate with particular others, reputational consequences, and punishment 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Gintis et al., 2003; Tomasello, 2016). Given this relational 
dimension of morality, it makes sense that we might be specifically motivated to act 
morally towards particular others, especially if they are our friends.  
We are often motivated to be partial in acting towards our friends. Friendship involves 
concern for our friends for their own sake; or, to put it another way, having de re attitudes 
towards them (Alfano, 2017). Besides, as Friedman (1989) notices, the commitment we 
have with our friends makes us see their interests, ends and values as both justifying and 
motivating reasons for our actions. Therefore, we end up being motivated to act because of 
our friends’ sake, and we see this acting for their sake as a valid justification for our action.  
The Practical Problem: Friendship demands Motivation to be Partial 
Not only are we motivated to be partial in acting towards our friends, but we also tend to 
think that we ought to be. Even conceding, for the sake of the argument, that humans could 
be morally motivated to help friends only out of duty, this is not what we would 
normatively expect, or demand, from a friend. Indeed, Barney’s acting out of the Bro code 
is presented as an unrealistic element which intends to make us laugh. In real life we 
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would be surprised, and even indignant, at Barney’s attitude, and Ted would probably 
resent him. Darwall accepts this as a possible reaction, yet he finds it unjustified. 
According to him, given our psychology, it is natural that we humans feel sometimes 
unfitting, or unjustified emotions: such as feeling shame for surviving the Holocaust (Levi, 
2017). Therefore, Ted might feel resentment against Barney, but this resentment would not 
be justified because Barney would have acted morally, for the good reasons.  
We morally assess others’ emotional responses. In the traditional Kantian view, there is no 
room for moral criticism about emotions, because they are too changeable, and capricious 
to ever be appropriate. Yet in our daily life we require appropriate emotional responses 
from others (Blum, 1980, p.27). This is something that Darwall certainly acknowledges; 
given his emphasis on the role of the reactive attitudes as a way of implicitly holding 
others accountable. In other words, according to Darwall, we are justified to blame 
someone if their emotional expressions are inappropriate, or morally wrong; but we 
cannot do it if those expressions are simply unfitting.  
Leaving apart the ethical debate about whether we are justified in resenting our friends for 
helping us purely out of duty, it seems that the Kantian account is undesirable in practice: 
it has unwanted consequences, as we certainly would not want our friends to act as 
Darwall and Kant propose. Hence, the Kantian proposal fails to capture our mutual 
normative expectations. We do not want our friends to help us because that is the moral 
thing to do (Keller, 2007; Stocker, 1976). This is too detached a picture of friendship. When 
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we ask a friend for help, we want them both to act out of motivation to be partial, and 
sometimes to do it without further thought. 
First, we want our friends to help us because it is us. In friendship we want others to act 
because we are that particular person in relationship to them, and not because our moral 
obligations have been shaped by some feature of the situation. Even more, we consider 
that our friends ought to act out for our sake. Therefore, we would feel resentful if a friend 
told us that he helped us because “that is the right thing to do”. In the case of Ted and his 
friends Robin and Barney, he would probably resent his friends if they visited him at 
hospital because they would do it for anyone who happened to be in that circumstance, 
instead of doing it simply because it is him.  
Second, we want our friends to act without further thought, and we think that they ought 
to. The fact that our friends are in trouble provides us with “one thought too many” 
(Williams, 1981). We would not like to know that our friends helped us after a long 
deliberation about the moral nature of the action; neither that they wondered about it 
afterwards (Wolf, 2012). As Wolf (2012) puts it, “I don’t want my partner to have to think 
or be concerned about thinking about moral permissibility in order for him to choose to 
save me” (p.79), her hope being that “he not care so much about the rulings of morality (in 
these instances) at all” (p.80). When being helped by friends, we want them to be affected 
by our needs, and be motivated to act accordingly. Only after that we might accept their 
wondering about the impartial standpoint. Therefore, not only do we want our friends to 
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act because we are the ones in need; but also, we want them to do it without further 
reflection. 
The Theoretical Problem: The Implicit Obligations of Friendship 
In our view, the Kantian proposal assumes too strong a separation between the affective 
domain, and the normative one. According to him, our obligations towards our friends 
bind us because we are aware that we might be held accountable. Our relationship with 
them is just a sort of contextual feature which might shape the content, and strength of our 
obligations, but which does not explain their binding force. Thus, according to Darwall, 
Barney feels bound to comply with his obligations as a friend because he is aware that he 
could be held accountable, rather than out of a push to help stemming from his 
relationships.  
We find this picture implausible: our feeling obliged is constitutive of our relationships 
with friends (Scanlon, 2000; Scheffler, 1997). It goes with friendship that it gives us 
obligations, whether there is a moral community who can hold us accountable or not. It is 
hard to conceive how someone can be emotionally bonded with someone else but feel 
morally obliged by the awareness of the possibility of being held accountable by anyone in 
the moral community, instead of feeling bound by the relationship itself.  We feel that we 
ought to comply with our obligations towards friends because of our friends; not simply 
because they are “obligations”, or “norms”. As a matter of fact, there cannot be such a 
thing as a “bro code” – a set of special obligations between friends –, because special 
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obligations depend upon the particular circumstances of each case and the capacities of 
the agents involved.  
The special obligations that we have towards our friends find their binding force in the 
relationship itself and emerge from it (Scheffler, 1997). Critically, whereas in the Kantian 
account friendship only turns our obligations into special obligations, which ultimately 
derive from the moral law; our claim is rather that those special obligations actually 
emerge from friendship and are later on generalized and understood in an abstract way. 
Friendship is not simply a feature which modifies the moral picture, but a whole new 
picture in which two people grow, bound up with each other, and form normative 
expectations about each other’s behavior. Due to the affective bond that links friends, 
these normative expectations might be felt as specially binding, and hence experienced as 
implicit obligations, or norms. Therefore, whereas in the Kantian approach our personal 
obligations in friendship are derived from impersonal obligations; in our approach our 
obligations in friendship are indeed personal, and only later can be experienced as 
impersonal. 
The binding force, and the constitutive dependence on the relationship of our obligations 
towards friends is revealed in cases of failure or transgression. This is exactly what we 
learn from Barney. In one of the episodes of ‘How I Met Your Mother’, Barney 
transgresses one of the rules of his Bro code and does something wrong to Ted. As 
expected, he feels guilty: he does not know how to act in front of Ted, he is anxious, and 
he avoids some conversations with his other friends. He attributes these bad feelings to the 
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fact that he has broken one of the articles of the Bro Code, so he hires his friend Marshall 
as a lawyer to find a loophole in the code and get him off the hook. What makes the 
situation funny is that we all know that our moral psychology does not really go like 
Barney wants, especially in cases where our friends are involved. First, we do not expect 
our obligations towards friends to be susceptible of being written in a code, as Barney 
tries. As previously said, our normative expectations towards friends are not like traffic 
norms, or norms of etiquette, which can be made explicit in a code. They are implicit in 
our relationships with friends. Second, we all know that what makes Barney feel bad is not 
that he has broken a rule; was the rule not written in his Bro Code he would still feel bad. 
What makes him feel bad is that he has not been a good friend to Ted, whatever the Bro 
code says, and whatever another person in that situation could have done. He feels guilty 
because of the wrongdoing he has done to his friend, which has damaged their 
relationship; not because of his failure to comply with a norm that any person in those 
circumstances ought to follow, neither because he is aware of the justified accountability 
demands from the community. Therefore, he can only feel better if Ted forgives him, as his 
friend Marshall tells him:  
Okay, this isn't about the Bro Code, and you know it. The reason that you're upset is 
because what you did was wrong. And the only way you're ever gonna feel any better 
about it is if you tell Ted what you did.  
What Marshall is assuming is that obligations in friendship are of a particular nature: they 
are constitutive of friendship, and implicit in it.   
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This implicit nature of our obligations towards friends puts them in a blurry area between 
normative and descriptive expectations. More specifically, special obligations towards 
friends combine what a friend is expected to do and what they should do. They are 
between the traditional moral judgments, which explicitly apply norms to particular 
circumstances, prescribing what someone should do; and the empirical, descriptive, or 
statistical expectations, which simply describe what someone will do. Despite this fuzzy 
nature, they are still normative because, as we have seen, their transgression involves a 
kind of reproach which can be either explicit through verbal speech, or implicit through 
reactive attitudes. Barney’s guilt, or Ted’s resentment towards Barney are just some 
examples showing that a normative expectation is at stake, and hence that in friendship 
we assume certain norms and obligations, only that implicitly.  
Moral Motivation, and Moral Obligations in Friendship 
We have argued that the Kantian account of love as void of deontic implications does not 
capture our moral psychology. The difficulties we have raised for this account in the 
previous section can therefore be avoided when our moral psychology is considered. In 
what follows, we propose a more accurate picture of the special obligations that love and 
friendship ground.    
Affective relationships need time to develop. Love emerges out of positive interactions 
and gets reinforced through them. These interactions can be of multiple kinds: we might 
coordinate for a joint enterprise, we might share interest in some event or circumstance, or 
we might jointly move. By default, intersubjective interaction is rewarding. The result of a 
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trajectory of interactions is an increased, or decreased, affection for each other. This loving 
affection motivates us to include the interests of our friend as part of our own interests. In 
this way, we become prosocially motivated. Sometimes, we experience this motivation as 
deontic: we feel that it is our duty to do what is in our hand to help our friends and expect 
them to do the same for us. This is what friendship consists of. 
In friendship, then, friends might perceive particular circumstances of difficulty or need of 
the other as a source of a moral obligation to help and feel motivated to act accordingly 
because of the relationship itself. Were it not for the affective bond between Ted and 
Robin, and between Ted and Barney, they would not feel motivated to act in a particular 
way towards each other, and they would not feel guilty when failing to act according to 
their recognized duty. It is when Ted and Robin see each other as friends that they 
mutually adjust to each other, feel motivated to do it, normatively expect it from each 
other, and react if the other does not comply. It is not that they share a code of mutual 
obligations; what they share is a commitment to be sensitive to each other’s’ needs and 
circumstances, given their capabilities and conditions.  
The Kantian view does not match our moral psychology. There is no such a thing as 
“obligations of loving relationship” (2016, p.172), or “duties of relationship” (2016, p.177). 
It is the particular circumstances of the situation that might license the acknowledgement 
of an obligation and the motivation to carry it out. This is especially the case when the 
protests for incompliance are endorsed by an uninvolved third-party (Isern-Mas & 
Gomila, 2018). Different friendship relationships may license different duties (Scheffler, 
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1997), and thus those might be differently sanctioned by a third-party. For instance, back 
to the sitcom “How I Met Your Mother”, at least twice in the show Ted feels the duty to 
provide a shelter to Robin, even if nobody else would go that far in helping her, and even 
if nobody would blame Ted for not doing so. Furthermore, he might feel the duty to 
provide a shelter to his friend Robin, after she loses her job or after she breaks up with her 
partner, because nobody else is in a position to help her, whereas he does not feel so 
motivated when it is his friend Barney who loses a job or who goes through a break-up, as 
he can count on several other helpers.  
Darwall’s view of love as independent of accountability also overlooks the fact that duties 
of friends are generally not demanded or claimed but should be recognized anyway. 
Special duties, for Darwall, are viewed as duties, but moral obligation in friendship works 
differently. Friends might not hold each other accountable for their actions or omissions. 
They need not address each other demands. A friend is one that is sensitive to their 
friend’s needs. If one is not so sensitive, friendship goes away. 
In other words, love, and affective relationships in general, entail a deontic dimension. 
This does not mean that there exists a right to be loved or to have friends (Darwall, 2016; 
Liao, 2015), but that friendship partly involves experiencing duties towards particulars 
others and be sensitive to their claims and demands. Darwall contends that these duties do 
not go with love itself, but stem from accountability relationships. Yet friendship is not so 
well structured and defined; it is not possible to provide a closed list of duties of 
friendship. 
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On the other hand, given this influence of the kind of relationship in the emergence of 
moral motivation, and moral obligation, the role of love is essential. Especially in the 
context of friendship, love is not just a feature that adds to the picture, and slightly 
changes the motivation to comply, or the kind of obligations which are already present. 
Rather is it part of the context in which those motivations, and obligations emerge. In 
other words, it is not that motivation to be partial, and special obligations come from a 
slightly change in motivation to be impartial, and moral obligations, as the Kantian 
approach contends. In the context of friendship, those are the original forms in which 
obligation and moral motivation emerge in the first place. Ted’s, Robin’s and Barney’s 
motivations and obligations towards each other do not derive from abstract principles, 
and a general motivation to act morally. Only after several second-personal interactions, 
among them, and among many other persons, and after observing, and endorsing those 
dynamics in others, they can get a sense of what motivation, and moral obligations one 
ought to have in the context of friendship. In other words, only from being motivated to be 
partial, and from following special obligations can they later be motivated to be impartial 
and follow some general obligations.  
By adopting this view, we avoid the three problems that the Kantian project had to face: 
the psychological, the practical, and the theoretical ones. First, we can explain why we feel 
a moral motivation to be partial in the case of friendship: motivation to be partial is the 
kind of motivation which appears first in a real interaction with a particular person. Only 
after several interactions of this kind, and observation of, and intervention in others’ 
interactions, we can reach a motivation to be impartial. Motivation to be partial is not an 
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impulse which comes from our imperfect rationality and which we must overcome; rather 
it is the first kind of motivation that we acquire in friendship. Only after being motivated 
to be partial we can generalize and be motivated by impartiality.  
Second, our account can explain that we want our friends both to act out of motivation to 
be partial, and sometimes to do it without further thought. Since moral obligations emerge 
from friendship, it makes sense that we might have some particular demands in that 
context that we might not have in others (Scheffler, 1997). We demand our friends be 
motivated to be partial because this normative expectation is built upon how we normally 
act towards our friends. We normally act motivated to be partial, then we come to expect 
that this is how “real friends” ought to be motivated. Hence, we end up seeing this 
expectation as normative, and further as an implicit obligation in friendship. Whether we 
are justified or not in claiming this motivation in our friends, our approach helps us 
understanding why we have such a demand.  
Finally, we do not have the theoretical problem because in our proposal the moral 
obligation, and the moral motivation we have towards our friends develop through 
interaction with them. When, after several interactions, we become someone’s friends, we 
also come to grasp which moral obligations we have towards them and come to feel 
motivated by those obligations. Friendship without moral motivation and moral 
obligations is not possible.  
The Morality of Friendship 
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Many would agree that friendship gives rise to special obligations. Yet a controversial part 
of our argument is the claim that these special obligations are moral. Someone could reject 
this strong claim on the basis that friendship does not need to ground moral obligations, 
but simply imperfect obligations (Cocking & Kennett, 2000). Although these obligations 
might be normative, they do not need to be “moral”5.  
The dichotomy between moral and non-moral norms is confusing (Kelly et al., 2007). 
Beyond mere categorization, we are interested in the nature of our obligations in the 
context of friendship, and their similarities with the so-called “moral” obligations. Our 
approach is functional. Therefore, by calling both kinds of norm “moral” we aim to 
highlight that they share a similar phenomenology and a similar underlying psychology.  
Moral obligations are those obligations that come with a strong “ought”, that is, with a 
feeling of duty that strongly motivates us to act (Björnsson et al., 2014; Rosati, 2016; 
Roskies, 2003; Tomasello, 2019). This is what Darwall and Kant capture either with the fact 
of reason or with the awareness of what the moral community could legitimately hold one 
accountable for not doing. When we deliberate about whether we should act morally, we 
experience a feeling of duty that strongly motivates us to do so. For instance, this feeling is 
at work when Robin feels so strongly motivated to visit her friend Ted at hospital. What 
makes her obligation moral is not that it is derived from an abstract moral law, but that it 
is experienced with a sense of duty.  
 
5  We are indebted for this objection to two anonymous reviewers. 
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The psychological mechanisms underlying the sense of duty that comes with moral 
obligations is “internalization” (Gavrilets & Richerson, 2017; Gintis, 2003). Starting from a 
naturalized interpretation of Darwall’s schema (Isern-Mas & Gomila, 2020), we posit that 
the feeling of obligation comes from internalization of those expectations that other 
members of the moral community, including our friends, might hold about our behavior. 
Importantly, these expectations are built after several interactions with particular others; 
and become normative once shared, and internalized by the members of the moral 
community (Bicchieri, 2016; Isern-Mas & Gomila, 2018). When we internalize this kind of 
anticipated sanction, or blame, we feel the obligation to act accordingly (Tomasello, 2019).  
In our obligations towards our friends, we internalize the same dynamics: we anticipate 
what our friends could legitimately blame us for not doing, based on those normative 
expectations that we have built along our interactions. We do not simply have an 
expectation about how we tend to act towards our specific friends; critically, we hold 
normative expectations about how we should act towards them. Furthermore, we also 
hold expectations not only on how they might react if we did not act as expected; but we 
also hold expectations on how they could legitimately react to our wrongdoing. These 
normative expectations are built both through multiple interactions with our friends, and 
our internalization of their legitimate reactions. Because of this shared mechanism of 
internalization, obligations from friendship might be equated to the typically moral ones.  
Despite the similarities between our obligations in the context of friendship and the 
typically moral obligations, their content might be in conflict. The so-called moral 
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obligations might be at odds with the demands that emerge from friendship. In some 
occasions, we might feel motivated to commit a moral transgression to help a friend 
(Cocking & Kennett, 2000; Koltonski, 2016; Trujillo, 2020). However, as we have 
emphasized, what makes obligations “moral”, in our view, is not their content, neither the 
action that they command; rather the fact that they come with a feeling of obligation that 
comes from the psychological mechanism of internalization (Sznycer et al., 2018). 
Consequently, although an obligation in the context of friendship and a typically moral 
obligation might be in conflict, they can still both share a similar psychological structure. 
Furthermore, the experience of conflict is a widely recognized psychological phenomenon: 
different obligations might put us in a dilemma, by prescribing incompatible paths of 
actions (McConnell, 2014). Hence, the possibility of conflict is not specific of the interaction 
between typically moral norms and norms that emerge from friendship.   
Conclusion  
Against the Kantian account, we have argued for a constitutive dependence of friendship 
and moral obligations, and moral motivation. We contend that it is constitutive of 
friendship that it goes with a motivation to be partial, that is, a motivation to help our 
friends because they are our friends; the normative expectation of acting out of motivation 
to be partial; and special obligations which emerge from the relationship itself and which 
tend to be implicit, but still binding. Therefore, the role of love in our moral motivation 
and moral obligations towards friends is not just complementary, but essential in giving 
rise to moral motivation and moral obligation themselves. 
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